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Abstract: This article studies the spatial extent of subcontracting linkages for a 
sample of medium-sized and large Spanish manufacturing firms operating in the 
automotive and electronics industries. In particular, we analyse how Just-in-
Time (JIT) organisation of production is related to the spatial pattern of these 
sourcing relationships when contractors' structural and organisational 
characteristics, as well as contract characteristics, are taken into account. We 
find that firms which implement new technologies and manufacturing systems at 
the plant level tend to prefer regional to extra-regional outsourcing. This is 
consistent with JIT’s reliance on flexibility in ordering and quick and frequent 
deliveries, as well as reliable arrival times, to guarantee the disruption-free 
production which proximity can facilitate. Our results support the view that JIT, 
in the context of production subcontracting, increases the importance of 
proximity. 
 
Keywords: Just-in-Time, new manufacturing technology, outsourcing, proximity, 
agglomeration 
 
JEL Classification:  L14, L62, L63, R3 
 
 
This is an electronic version of an article published in Regional Studies, volume 44, 5, 519-533, June  
2010, DOI: 10.1080/00343400902821626 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00343400902821626#.VOb55k05BMw
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The last twenty years have produced important changes in the organisation of 
production, namely a move towards interconnected production based on Just-
in-Time (JIT) techniques and the outsourcing of non-core activities.1 These are 
two key strategies for achieving flexible and lean production, essential for 
company competitiveness in a rapidly changing and increasingly global 
economy. 
An important question is how such increased flexibility in production relates to 
the spatial organisation of inter-firm relations. Some authors argue that JIT and 
subcontracting strategies produce fundamental changes in the relationship 
between production organisation and space, often linked to the increased 
importance of proximity. While subcontracting may be facilitated by 
geographical proximity, the literature on international outsourcing also shows 
that subcontracting relations can be maintained over long distances. JIT may, 
however, reinforce the need for proximity, as it relies on quick and frequent 
deliveries and closer relationships and communication among firms. For JIT to 
be effective, flexibility in ordering and reliability of arrival times are crucial (Allen 
et al., 1994), and these may heighten the importance of geographical proximity. 
Thus, JIT might constitute an additional agglomerative force (Gale, 1999; 
Harrigan and Venables, 2006). 
Empirical evidence regarding the spatial implications of JIT is, however, limited 
and inconclusive. Various authors hold that JIT has indeed encouraged the 
shortening of input linkages and placed greater emphasis upon geographical 
proximity (Reid, 1994; McCann and Fingleton, 1996).2 Plant location studies 
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also provide evidence for the importance of highway access in ensuring 
punctual delivery on a just-in-time basis (Smith and Florida, 1994). Klier (1999; 
2000), drawing on the U.S. auto supplier industry, argues that agglomeration 
takes place principally at the regional level, and that access to transportation 
which allows deliveries “within a day's drive” is more important than close 
proximity between suppliers and assembly plants. Sadler (1994) and Echeverri-
Carroll (1996) argue, with regard to the European automotive industry, that JIT 
does not necessarily lead to agglomeration.  
With decreasing transport costs, advanced communication and the increasing 
importance of non-material flows, analysts have cast doubt on the importance of 
physical distance as a barrier to inter-company relations. However, even if 
pecuniary costs for goods transport are assumed to be low, the increasing 
importance of the cost of time, of flexibility in the ordering of inputs and of the 
reliability of scheduled transport flows (Hummels, 2001; Harrigan and Venables, 
2006) must nevertheless be taken into account.  
The literature regarding the relationship between geographical proximity and JIT 
is principally based on case studies in the automotive industry, in which many 
first-tier suppliers and subcontractors undertake JIT deliveries (Sadler, 1994; 
Frigant and Lung, 2002; Larsson, 2002). Today, JIT is also being increasingly 
adopted in other sectors (Gale, 1999) e.g. the electronics industry (MC Cann 
and Fingleton 1996, Gallander & Larsson, 2000). A different strand of literature 
has examined the spatial pattern of inter-firm relations in a more general context 
(Clarke, 1994; Hendry, 2000; Britton, 2003; Holl and Rama, 2009), but has not 
considered the specific role of JIT. 
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This article contributes to research into the spatial dimension of inter-firm 
linkages by focusing specifically on the effect of Just-in-Time manufacturing 
systems (hereafter, JIT manufacturing) upon the spatial pattern of 
subcontracting relations. JIT manufacturing is a flexible system of production 
aimed at reducing lead time and excessive work in progress inventories at the 
plant level, while helping to improve productivity and product quality. It often 
involves the use of new technology, such as computer integrated 
manufacturing, cellular layouts and advanced information systems. This new 
technology is also frequently associated with the implementation of innovative 
management practices, such as JIT sourcing.  
The present article analyses detailed survey data for a sample of Spanish 
electronics and automotive producers, in order to determine whether 
contractors using new technology and organisation display the same 
geographical patterns as contractors who employ a more traditional approach to 
manufacturing. We argue that the implementation of a new organisation of 
production within factories encourages firms to develop geographically closer 
external relationships. 
Focusing specifically on JIT manufacturing and subcontracting permits the 
identification of those characteristics of manufacturing technology which may 
make partner proximity more important. This approach helps to explain why the 
agglomeration of industry, and in particular of high technology sectors, is a 
continuing phenomenon, despite important reductions in transport and 
communication costs. 
Below, Section 2 discusses the role of proximity in the organisation of 
production. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents the model and 
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discusses the determinants of the geographical extent of subcontracting 
linkages.  Section 5 offers our empirical results and a discussion and Section 6 
is dedicated to our conclusions. 
 
2. SPACE IN THE ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION.  THE ROLE OF 
PROXIMITY  
There exists no general theory of the spatial dimension of inter-firm linkages 
(and of subcontracting relations in particular). However, spatial economic 
analysis, focusing on the determinants of the location of economic activity 
across space, is a long-standing research field. Costs and interdependence 
between firms have been accepted as the principal factors explaining the role of 
proximity in company location. A further branch of the literature has analysed 
why companies engage in inter-firm relations instead of vertically integrated 
production. Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) concentrates on the trade-off of the 
costs and benefits associated with different forms of governance: markets, 
hierarchies (firms) and hybrids (e.g. subcontracting networks) (Williamson, 
1991). Inter-firm relations involve costs of establishing and maintaining an 
external relationship (Williamson 1985). This involves search and information 
costs, bargaining and decision costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs 
(Grossman and Hart 1986). Williamson (1985) also refers to the costs involved 
in product flows, such as transport costs and those of product losses and 
damages. Transaction costs increase when these transactions are frequent 
(David and Han, 2004), as in the case of JIT systems. Though distance and 
location are constants in earlier TCT abstract models (Williamson, 1991), recent 
work by Harrigan and Venables (2006) and Feenstra and Spence (2006), 
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among others, shows that these costs are presumably more of a deterrent in 
long-distance relations.  
Today, although transport costs may represent a relatively small percentage of 
total costs for most firms, other logistic costs may still be substantial (McCann, 
2001). In the inventory model proposed by McCann (1993), optimum firm 
location depends on the balancing of inventory holding costs, procurement 
costs and transport costs. JIT implies more frequent deliveries. At the optimized 
Economic Order Quantities (EOQ), this increases transport costs and 
encourages localization (McCann 1993, 1998). 
Focusing specifically on the implications of JIT for agglomerations, Harrigan and 
Venables (2006) show, in a theoretical model, how the need for timeliness in 
delivery encourages clustering. Proximity between supplier and customer is 
important to provide flexibility and to reduce demand uncertainty. Harrigan and 
Venables study two types of uncertainty. Firstly, there is greater uncertainty 
regarding delivery times for components from remote suppliers. This implies a 
greater risk of costly production delays caused by late arrival, while localised 
sourcing benefits from timeliness. Secondly, decisions regarding inputs from 
remote sources have to be taken earlier and thus involve greater uncertainty 
regarding the level of demand or cost. By contrast, decisions concerning locally 
produced inputs can be taken at later stages, once a greater degree of 
uncertainty has been resolved. In both cases, uncertainty encourages the 
clustering of component producers. Producers in the clusters benefit from 
flexibility in ordering, which leads to higher productivity compared to producers 
in other locations, who do not enjoy the benefits of timeliness in delivery from 
local sourcing. Harrigan and Venables (2006) argue that proximity is a 
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quantitative dimension of the cost of exchange and interaction, but is also an 
important qualitative aspect of reducing uncertainty.3  
Proximity not only reduces distance costs and permits greater flexibility, since 
inputs can be more easily obtained in smaller quantities or on an as-needed 
basis, but also facilitates close contacts between clients (contractors) and 
suppliers (subcontractors) in collaborative arrangements which require frequent 
face-to-face contact.   
A further theory may help to explain geographic distance through the 
interdependence of firms. In management literature, network theory stresses 
that inter-firm relations will be affected by cost-minimising concerns as well as 
by power (see, for example, Sacchetti and Sudgen, 2003). This approach 
focuses on the uneven distribution of resources, information and control within 
inter-firm relations and the consequent unequal abilities of actors within 
networks to dominate the behaviour of others. Firms with more exchange 
alternatives and greater resources enjoy a better negotiating position (Lee, 
2002). Powerful firms are better equipped to impose their own distributive rules 
not only within the network, but probably upon even extra-regional partners. 
However, the distribution of power within networks may change, depending on 
the duration of relations. Grandori and Neri (1999) and Sacchetti and Sudgen 
(2003) believe repeated and long-lasting relations are a necessary condition for 
the adoption of “fairness rules” and the basis of mutual relationships in which 
power becomes evenly distributed amongst network partners; they argue that 
such mutual relationships create “proximity”.4 
Despite these theoretical developments, few empirical studies have specifically 
analysed the spatial extent of inter-firm relations. Hendry et al. (2000), Britton 
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(2003) and Rosenthal and Strange (2001) suggest that material linkage patterns 
are not necessarily local, but rather span over wider geographical areas. Clarke 
(1994) and more recently, Holl and Rama (2009) show that there is a clear 
geographical dimension to different inter-firm linkages and, more specifically, to 
different forms of governance. Network linkages are in general shorter than 
arm’s-length5 input-output transactions, suggesting that proximity is more 
important for networking than for arm’s-length relations that primarily involve 
standardised products and formal relations. This is consistent with the fact that 
network agreements imply deeper, steadier, and more informal relationships.  
Holl and Rama (2009) also show that, from among the different types of 
network relations, subcontracting relations are the most localised type of 
cooperation.  
The growing complexity of industrial organisation is likely to make the role of 
proximity more complicated; improved knowledge of the particular 
circumstances in which proximity matters is therefore of increasing importance. 
 
3. DATA 
The data employed in the following analysis were obtained from a company-
level survey targeting firms in the electronics and automotive industries and 
conducted in 20036. All the companies had 50 or more employees.  Their main 
activities were the manufacturing of: 1) electronics, TV and radio equipment, 2) 
electronics components, 3) office machines and informatics equipment, 4) 
motor vehicles and carriage building, and 5) other transport equipment, such as 
motorcycles. 
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In order to establish the dimension of the population of plants in terms of sector, 
region and size, we used the information provided by the Directorio Central de 
Empresas (Central Directory of Companies - DIRCE) from the National Institute 
of Statistics. To select the sample, the regional and sectoral distribution of 
plants indicated by DIRCE was taken into account. Here, regions are the 17 
Spanish Autonomous Communities.  Sectors were defined according to the 
CENAE classification (National Classification of Economic Activities). We 
selected companies for analysis from the Dun & Bradstreet Spain list.  The 
response rate was 71.2%. Given their size, sector and geographic location, the 
sampled firms are statistically representative of firms with over 50 employees in 
the above mentioned Spanish industries. For a confidence level of 95.5%, the 
sampling error is ± 6.9%. 
A pre-test of the questionnaire was conducted and all the principal problems 
encountered (e.g. poor understanding of some questions) were addressed 
before the fieldwork was commenced.  At the company level, in most cases we 
interviewed Directors of Production, each personal interview lasting 
approximately one hour. The survey does not suffer from significant item non-
response. Some of the questions follow an ordinal 1-5 Likert scale, indicating 
the interviewee’s assessment (Appendix 2). In contrast to variables which 
capture objective and quantitative information, it is well known that subjective 
evaluations may contain a greater degree of error. On the other hand, such 
variables are sufficiently robust and allow valuable dimensions of a factor, which 
would otherwise remain concealed, to be captured. Moreover, assessments and 
evaluations are a basic facet of organisational life.  
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The total sample includes 162 companies, of which 24.7% operate in the 
electronics industry, 65.4% in the automotive field and 3.7% in the "other 
transport equipment" sector. The sample also includes 10 firms (6.2%) which 
supply part of their output to these industries but are classified under other 
headings (e.g. rubber and plastics or machinery and mechanical equipment). 
Firms in the automotive and electronics industries and in auxiliary industries 
were asked to rate, using a 1-5 Likert scale, the importance of 32 different 
economic activities (e.g. the manufacture of electronics components). We 
identified a group of firms involved in the manufacture of automotive and 
electronics products, even if this was not their principal activity. A company 
which indicates “machinery and mechanical equipment” as its main activity, for 
instance, may also produce parts and components used in motorcycle 
manufacture. In other words, part of its production may consist of “other 
transport equipment”. Our sample includes affiliates of companies such as 
Siemens and Samsung in the electronics industry and Volkswagen, Renault 
and Daimler-Chrysler in the automotive industry.     
The sample includes vertically integrated firms and firms participating in 
outsourcing networks as contractors (clients), subcontractors (suppliers) or 
both.  We use this sample of 162 companies to determine the diffusion of JIT 
and subcontracting in the industries selected and the general relationship 
between the two. As stated in the Introduction, however, our more specific 
intention is to establish whether contractors using new technology and 
organisation display the same geographic patterns as contractors who employ a 
more traditional approach to manufacturing.  Thus, in section 5 we focus on the 
sub-sample of firms which subcontract part of their production activities.   
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 Sectors analysed 
After Germany and France, Spain is the third largest European producer of 
automobiles7.  Approximately 82% of Spanish vehicle production is exported. 
The largest assemblers are well represented in most Spanish regions: for 
example, Peugeot and Citroën in Galicia; Nissan, Seat, etc. in Catalonia; Ford 
in Valencia; Daimler Chrysler in the Basque Country; and Renault and others in 
Andalucía.  The electronics industry is also important in Spain.  For instance, 
the Spanish ICT (Information and Communication Technology) industry 
(including services) amounts to around €70 billion, nearly 10% of Spanish GDP. 
Electronics manufacturing firms tend to cluster mainly in Madrid, Catalonia and 
the Basque Country (which together account for nearly 85% of total production), 
although other regions, such as Andalusia, Valencia and Aragon are also 
producer regions. 
 
Subcontracting and JIT 
Definition of JIT 
The JIT system involves developing both JIT manufacturing and JIT delivery 
capabilities (Echeverri-Carroll, 1996). In our empirical analysis we specifically 
concentrate on JIT manufacturing, as our objective is to study the potential 
association between the use of new organisational forms for manufacturing and 
the production of technologies and the importance of geographic inter-
establishment proximity in subcontracting relations.8 The JIT delivery system 
means that small and precise deliveries must be made by suppliers exactly 
when needed by the assembler plant. The JIT manufacturing system “originally 
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referred to the production of goods to meet the customer demand exactly, in 
time, quality and quantity” and now means producing with minimum waste of 
time and resources.9 Inside the factory, the implementation of JIT 
manufacturing includes new practices such as improved quality control, 
preventive maintenance, the avoidance of mistakes, eliminating waiting time 
wastage due to product defects, greater cleanliness and more efficient 
organisation, a multi-skilled workforce, ensuring a smooth flow of products 
through the factory, etc.. For instance, timewasting may consist of workers 
remaining idle, which is not uncommon in a sequential line production process.  
To solve this problem, factories which implement JIT manufacturing can, among 
other solutions: smooth the flow of products through the plant; reduce set-up 
time; train their employees to use alternative machines, etc... 
 
Subcontracting and JIT in the sample            
Table A1 provides information for both the total sample of 162 companies and 
the sub-sample of 130 companies that subcontract. Subcontracting and JIT 
manufacturing are common strategies among the sample firms. From among all 
the sampled firms, approximately 80% subcontract and 58% report that they 
use JIT manufacturing. 61.8% of the plants in the total sample also report JIT 
sourcing and approximately 75% report the use of JIT for at least half of 
deliveries to their customers. Although few firms use JIT in all their sourcing and 
deliveries, the companies studied are linked quite closely by JIT relationships. 
In fact, only 16 firms (9.9%) in our total sample make no use whatsoever of 
JIT.10 While electronics firms are more likely to subcontract, JIT manufacturing 
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is more common in the automotive industry. Nevertheless, almost half of the 
electronics companies are also JIT manufacturers.   
In their analysis of the Los Angeles Basin, Suarez-Villa and Walrod (1997) find 
that 54% of the electronics producers utilised JIT production methods as early 
as the mid-1990s. Comparison with our results suggests that Spanish 
electronics producers adopted such methods relatively late. By contrast, 
outsourcing of production is far more common in our sample of electronics firms 
than in that of Suarez-Villa and Walrod (58%). Since the implementation of JIT 
usually entails both risks and substantial investment, many Spanish electronics 
producers may have preferred to fully exploit a cooperation strategy to achieve 
flexibility, benefiting from an enduring “network culture” in their sector (Estevan, 
1988; Suarez-Villa and Rama, 1996).  We shall return to companies’ search for 
flexibility below.   
 
4. SELECTION OF THE MODEL AND VARIABLES 
We analyse whether companies that subcontract regionally display specific 
characteristics, notably the adoption of JIT manufacturing. We estimate the 
probability that a firm’s main subcontractors are exclusively located within its 
same region. The regional dimension of subcontracting patterns is important for 
policymakers. Regions in Spain enjoy a high degree of self-determination and 
fiscal autonomy and develop their own territorial programmes (Suarez-Villa and 
Cuadrado Roura, 1993). 
We represent intra-regional subcontracting yi by firm i = 1, 2, etc. by a binary 
choice model: 
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*1
0
i
i
if y
y
otherwise
⎧ ≥= ⎨⎩
0
 (1)  
where the latent variable *iy , which represents firm i’s underlying propensity to 
subcontract within the region in which it is located is a linear function of 
observable firm-specific characteristics ci, characteristics of the production 
process pi, and characteristics of the specific subcontracting relation rj.  
*
1 2 2i i i iy c p r iβ β β= + + +ν  (2) 
 
The term itν  captures the effects of unobserved factors and is assumed to be 
i.i.d. normal. Since we focus on the spatial extent of subcontracting, estimations 
are based on a sub-sample of 128 firms which subcontract out part of their 
production and provide information regarding the location of their main 
subcontractors.11 
 
Independent variables 
We include in our model variables which the existing empirical and theoretical 
literature has related to the spatial extent of outsourcing linkages. These can be 
grouped into three sets of independent variables (see Appendix A2 for a 
description). The variables concern, respectively: company characteristics, the 
characteristics of its organisation of production and relation-specific 
characteristics. 
Firstly, the literature shows that specific company characteristics may affect 
firms’ spatial behaviour. On the one hand, the costs involved in setting up 
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distant network relations will be less onerous for certain firms and, on the other, 
access to specific resources can lower transaction costs and increase firms' 
ability to enforce contracts, particularly in the case of extra-regional relations. 
Such resources include financial and human capital, information, knowledge 
and other intangibles. 
Size: Costs related to establishing, monitoring, and enforcing network 
relationships over longer distances should be less of an impediment for larger 
firms. Larger firms are likely to have the necessary human and physical capital 
and market power necessary to gain information and enforce contracts over 
distance. Conversely, some empirical studies show that smaller companies 
have more limited geographical range, and thus are more deeply embedded in 
the regional economy, than large companies (Gray et al. 1996; Suarez-Villa and 
Rama, 1996). Here, we test whether smaller firms are more prone to outsource 
production regionally.   
Foreign ownership and single plant status: Arita and McCann (2002) argue that 
organisational structure influences the spatial behaviour of firms. The spatial 
linkage pattern of businesses which form part of multi-plant companies may be 
dictated by corporate structure. Such establishments are more likely to be 
integrated in a wider network, and are correspondingly more likely to engage in 
spatially broader inter-firm relations than single-plant companies (Holl and 
Rama, 2009). Similarly, foreign ownership may influence company 
management style and consequently affect spatial linkage patterns. Here, we 
test whether the likelihood of outsourcing intra-regionally is associated with 
specific types of company organisation.   
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Product innovation:  The literature demonstrates that when high-tech sector 
firms search for new technology, they may cooperate with both co-located 
companies and with extra-regional firms, On the one hand, the search for 
knowledge externalities may stimulate firms to co-locate. Empirical studies have 
shown that, in R&D-intensive industries where knowledge spillovers are 
substantial, the location of production tends to be geographically concentrated 
(Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). An analysis of the Spanish industry finds that 
electronics plants, for instance, tend to locate near their customers and 
suppliers (Alonso-Villar et al., 2004). This supports the idea that contractors 
outsource manufacturing locally in order to benefit from spillovers generated at 
the local level. On the other hand, companies in high-tech sectors require an 
increasingly wide range of technologies to manufacture their products, which 
may force them to use extra-regional suppliers to satisfy at least part of their 
innovation requirements (Dyer and Singh 1998, Brusoni et al. 2001). A different 
issue is whether, within a high-tech sector, the most R&D-intensive companies 
are actually willing to network with co-located firms. Innovative companies may 
prefer a degree of physical isolation from other clustered companies, so as to 
avoid the unintended spillover of new knowledge (Kearns and Görg, 2002; 
Nachum and Wymbs, 2002; Suarez-Villa, 2002). Ahuja (2000) also 
demonstrates that innovators may even be reluctant to network with other firms, 
although he does not explore the spatial dimension of company behaviour. 
Here, we test whether companies which generate internal or external product 
innovations are more likely to outsource intra-regionally (for definitions, see 
Appendix A2). 
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Secondly, the literature emphasises that in addition to companies’ structural 
characteristics, the way they organise their production may also be linked to the 
spatial extent of inter-firm relations. We specifically focus on how JIT 
manufacturing affects the spatial pattern of subcontracting relations, but also 
control for a number of other production-specific characteristics. 
JIT: JIT manufacturing potentially favours local outsourcing, due to the need for 
flexibility and for fast, frequent and reliable deliveries and communication, in 
order to keep component delivery scheduling tight (Allen et al. 1994). As 
Harrigan and Venables (2006) show, proximity is important to facilitate flexibility 
and reduce uncertainty in input ordering in timeliness production e.g. JIT. There 
are further reasons why JIT encourages, at least in theory, proximity between 
clients and suppliers. Car assemblers using JIT may prefer proximity if they feel 
that it simplifies social relations and facilitates control, and because willingness 
to locate in the vicinity of the assembly plant represents a sign of commitment 
on the part of the supplier (Larsson, 2002); the location of several suppliers 
near the assembly plant might increase the contractor’s bargaining power with 
respect to the rest of the network (Aláez-Aller and Erro-Garcés, 2006). 
Furthermore, as argued by Echeverri-Carroll (1996), JIT is not merely a delivery 
programme. The ability to produce components which conform to the 
specifications requested by the client requires the close coordination of 
manufacturing processes, implying the continuous sharing of information 
between client and supplier.   
Although the literature on this issue is almost non-existent, there exists some 
evidence to suggest that the implementation of JIT may heighten the 
importance of proximity in subcontracting relations. Clarke and Mia (1993) find 
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that, in some Australian industries, geographic proximity of customers and 
suppliers and a low level of vertical integration of the company, which denote a 
prevalence of outsourcing, are good predictors of the successful implementation 
of JIT manufacturing at the plant level. Analysing two large companies 
operating, respectively, in the Swedish automobile and electronics industries, 
Gallander and Larsson (2000) argue that “outsourcing may and may not have 
location implications“ (p.2). Focusing on JIT deliveries (rather than on JIT 
manufacturing, as in this article), they conclude that sequential JIT with short 
lead times is the most important location factor explaining local outsourcing.  
Here, we test whether firms which implement new technologies and 
manufacturing systems, such as JIT, are more likely to outsource intra-
regionally than those using more traditional manufacturing systems.  
Small batch production: JIT is a key characteristic of flexible production 
strategies. Flexible production organisation is also often associated with low-
volume and customised production (D'Costa, 2004). Small batch size involves 
the shortening of production cycles, the reduction of finished goods inventories 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), the production of smaller quantities and more 
customer-specific manufacture. As with JIT, small batch production tends to 
entail greater buyer-supplier cooperation and, according to some empirical 
evidence, the increased importance of suppliers' geographic proximity (D’Costa, 
2004). Here, we test whether companies which define their type of production 
as small batch production are more likely to outsource intra-regionally. 
CAD/CAM: JIT manufacturing can be implemented using either computer-aided 
design/computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) or traditional machinery. 
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Here, we test whether the employment of CAD/CAM may increase the 
importance of proximity between the implementing plant and its suppliers.  
Third, the particular characteristics of the subcontracting relation may also be 
linked to its spatial pattern.  
Subcontracting stage: The precise nature of the activity involved in the 
subcontracting relation may determine the relative importance of proximity. 
Depending on the production stage at which subcontracting takes place, the 
relation may involve either more face-to-face contact or an increased exchange 
of parts and components. If the need for face-to-face contact is great, proximity 
may become more important, but the exchange of bulky and submodular parts 
that involve high transport costs may also favour the proximity of supplier and 
client (Lee, 2002). Moreover, suppliers probably locate closer to their clients 
when they provide parts and components rather than finished products, as the 
former generally require more frequent delivery.12 It is common for system 
suppliers delivering finished products to form part of large domestic groups or 
multinational enterprises which supply car assemblers in a number of locations.  
Here, we test the relationships between the likelihood of outsourcing intra-
regionally and four different stages of the production process at which 
subcontracting takes place (see Appendix A2). These stages also reflect the 
type of goods or services outsourced. 
Stable subcontracting relations: Johanson and Mattson (1992) argue that the 
stability and duration of exchange relationships is especially important where 
the actors must adapt their heterogeneous resources to each other and the 
relationship becomes highly specialised. Stability generates trust (Sturgeon, 
2003), and in turn trust reduces the risk of opportunism and thereby lowers 
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transaction costs (Ring, 1999). The literature on the automotive industry in the 
US, Japan and some European countries shows that most of the contracts 
between assemblers and their suppliers are relatively long lasting (Aláez-Aller 
and Erro-Garcés, 2006; Baudry, 1993; Torreguitart-Mirada and Martínez-Parra, 
2000); according to Chanaron (1998), the new post-Fordist system of 
production means that assemblers select suppliers on the basis of their past 
relationship and proven performance record (rather than on the basis of 
tenders). Hoare (1985) argues that if inter-firm relations are stable, they can be 
planned more easily, and thus proximity is less important. However, in ad hoc 
relationships and, more generally, in relations that must be renegotiated 
periodically, the subcontracting partners may have a greater need for proximity. 
In particular, short-term contracts involve frequent renegotiations of price and 
new rounds of competition among suppliers (Baudry, 1993), which may 
encourage them to cluster around the assemblers in order to obtain updated 
information. We test whether companies are more likely to outsource intra-
regionally when the duration of contracts is relatively short. 
Responsibility: Where the subcontracting client and supplier have adopted a 
policy of close involvement, including, for example, information sharing, quality 
control or design participation, the relationship is more likely to require higher 
levels of interaction through substantial face-to-face contact, making proximity 
more important. Conversely, subcontracting suppliers with full responsibility for 
the production of parts or modular parts tend to require less supervision, and 
thus proximity may become less important. We test whether the likelihood of 
outsourcing regionally is greater when the company’s subcontracting suppliers 
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assume full responsibility for the manufacture of the entire final product (as 
opposed to parts or components). 
Flexibility motive:  This variable considers the client (contractor) motivation to 
outsource production. Certain characteristics of clients' organisation of 
production (e.g. flexible production) are taken by the literature to constitute a 
new form of manufacturing which is replacing Fordist factories (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990). This search for flexibility is a general strategy, aimed principally 
at speeding up company operations (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Thus, while 
firms’ principal motive for subcontracting is the need for greater flexibility, 
proximity may also become increasingly desirable. Therefore, we test whether 
the likelihood of outsourcing intra-regionally is greater when the company is 
highly motivated by the search for flexibility. 
Finally, the model also includes dummy variables to check for differences 
between sectors. 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
As Table 1 shows, there is an important regional dimension to subcontracting 
linkages. The pattern is very similar to that reported in López-Bayón (2001), 
Rama et al. (2003) and Holl and Rama (2009) for subcontracting among 
electronic firms in Spain, and confirms that important intra-regional linkages 
exist. Table 2 shows a strong relation between local subcontracting and JIT 
manufacturing. 
Table 3 presents the results of the multivariate probit analysis, and a number of 
interesting findings emerge. Firstly, JIT manufacturing has a significant positive 
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influence on the probability of subcontracting locally. Secondly, with regard to 
company characteristics other than JIT manufacturing, the coefficients are 
weak, in line with McCann and Fingleton (1996). In a study of the Scottish 
electronics industry, these authors found JIT sourcing to be the single most 
important factor influencing firms’ propensity towards local expenditure. In our 
analysis, only the dummy variable for companies which introduced product 
innovation in collaboration with external innovators (firms or institutions) is 
significant in Column 1, indicating that such firms are more likely to subcontract 
to suppliers outside their own region. A possible explanation is as follows:  
technological networking with extra-regional partners, often a necessity for firms 
in high-tech industries (Dyer and Singh 1998, Brusoni et al. 2001), may provide 
such companies with useful information on the “market” for possible outsourcing 
partners in distant localities.13 This may increase the willingness and ability of 
companies to outsource production extra-regionally.  In our sample, the 
coefficient for innovators who produce and develop their new products in-house 
is also negative, although not statistically significant. The relatively low pseudo-
R2 indicates that other factors are also likely to be influential.    
In Columns 2 and 3 we include two further characteristics of plants’ production 
processes: small batch production and CAD/CAM. While the former is not 
significant, CAD/CAM is significantly associated with local subcontracting.  In 
line with David and Han (2004), a possible explanation is that the utilisation of 
these new technologies may increase contractors’ transaction costs; contractors 
who have adopted them may attempt to reduce these costs by outsourcing 
exclusively within their own region. This hypothesis, however, deserves a more 
detailed analysis than that offered by the present article; the data available does 
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not permit the TC costs of contractors who use CAD/CAM to be compared to 
those of contractors who use more traditional technologies.     
In Column 4 of Table 3 we introduce additional variables to control for the stage 
at which subcontracting takes place. Stage1 (subcontracting of parts and 
modular components) increases the probability of local subcontracting, while 
Stage3 (subcontracting of final production) reduces this probability, compared to 
the control stage of subcontracting services to be integrated in the final product. 
This confirms that the subcontracting of parts and components manufacture has 
a greater local dimension. By contrast, if the subcontracted activity is located at 
the end of the production process, the subcontractor could be located closer to 
the final customer (to whom the product must be delivered) than to the 
subcontracting client i.e. proximity to the principal client is less important. Since 
these variables indirectly control for the characteristics of different types of 
suppliers, it is also possible that the suppliers of high-tech, non- standardised 
goods (e.g. final products) of our sample are limited in number and manufacture 
their products in only a few locations, as the suppliers analysed by Arita and 
McCann (2004). These qualitative aspects of local sourcing were also detected 
in the study of the Brazilian automotive industry performed by Frigant and Lung 
(2002). Column 5 includes a dummy variable for subcontracting relations lasting 
over two years. As expected, we find that when relations are stable they can be 
more easily organised, even over longer distances. Column 6 includes as an 
additional control variable a dummy that indicates whether the subcontractor 
assumes complete responsibility for the subcontracted activity. Full 
responsibility is also significantly associated, in our sample, with a lower 
probability of local subcontracting. Suppliers who accept entire responsibility 
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need less supervision, and are probably less involved in local subcontracting 
relations, thereby making proximity less important. As in the case of the stages 
of subcontracting, the introduction of this new variable in the model may also 
suggest that local suppliers have lower skill levels and produce items of lower 
added value. 
Finally, Column 7 includes information on the role of flexibility as a motive for 
production subcontracting. The results indicate that the greater the importance 
of flexibility, the greater is the probability of local outsourcing. Since flexibility is 
also a key characteristic of JIT manufacturing, our results support the view that 
co-location of supplier and client facilitates flexibility in modern production 
organisation (Harrigan and Venables, 2006).   
To test the predictive accuracy of the model, we calculate a classification 
matrix, which contains both the real and predicted classifications of the sampled 
firms. In the progression from model 1 to model 7, the percentage of correctly 
classified cases increases from 76% of the total to 86%. The goodness of fit of 
model 7 suggests that the microeconomic aspects selected for analysis here 
are instrumental to understanding why firms outsource production at the intra-
regional level.  
We find stronger evidence that proximity is more the result of production-
specific characteristics than of companies’ structural characteristics.14  Firstly, 
most of variables specifically related to production technology and relations 
display a consistent effect across different model specifications. Secondly, the 
inclusion of these variables produces a greatly improved pseudo-R2.   
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By contrast, in our sample, companies’ structural characteristics show much 
weaker and less robust effects. In Specification 7, only company size displays a 
statistically significant coefficient, indicating that larger firms are less restricted 
in their spatial extent of subcontracting, even when flexibility is a prime concern. 
As suggested by network theory, resources which represent elements of power 
can make it easier for companies to manage inter-firm relations over greater 
distances. Overall, however, our results provide only limited support for network 
theory, although a possible explanation may be the difficulty of 
operationalisation. Company power may produce, in our view, divergent 
outcomes regarding geographic proximity. As stated earlier, powerful 
contractors can not only enforce contracts over distance, but also pressurise 
their suppliers to co-locate (Aláez-Aller et al. 1999; D'Costa, 2002; Lee, 2002).  
If the size of a company and its possession of intangibles are also indicators of 
its power within a network, as the above theory suggests (Easton, 1992), then 
we find no evidence, in our sample, that companies are exploiting such power 
to oblige their suppliers to cluster around them.     
Regarding sectoral differences, Column 7 of Table 3 shows that the dummy 
variables for both electronics establishments and for other transport equipment 
display a significant negative effect. Compared to the automotive 
establishments in our sample, these plants are less likely to subcontract locally. 
A final note of caution is necessary; it is important to emphasise that the results 
should not be understood as evidence that causal relations exist. Firms make 
simultaneous decisions regarding their production organisation and the spatial 
extent of their subcontracting relations. Moreover, unobserved company 
characteristics (e.g. managerial governance skills) may also influence such 
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choices. Survey data of the type available in this study do not permit us to 
control for all these factors, or for the simultaneous nature of these decisions. 
Nevertheless, our analysis provides new exploratory empirical evidence 
regarding the particular circumstances in which proximity matters. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The results show how modern logistic and production strategies relate to the 
spatial organisation of production. Even among firms with a similar form of 
governance, we find that the search for flexibility in modern production 
organisation (e.g. the implementation of JIT production) produces a specific 
situation, in which proximity matters. A possible explanation is that some new 
modes of production organisation, which rely on flexibility and time-savings, 
also entail relatively high uncertainty and logistic transaction costs that increase 
in line with the physical distance between inter-connected companies.  These 
costs are probably offset by other benefits (e.g. lower production costs) or 
mitigated when companies, such as those studied here, network (Ring, 1999).  
This interpretation is suggested by our finding that stable subcontracting 
relationships permit more extensive geographic networks. However, these 
“new” transaction costs may be sufficiently high to persuade networked firms to 
outsource locally. This question, however, deserves more investigation than 
attempted in this paper.  
The results provide support for the role of JIT as a mechanism for 
agglomeration; this is consistent with the theoretical models proposed by 
McCann (1993, 1998) and Harrigan and Venables (2006). JIT effects work 
through the product market. While, in general, product market effects are likely 
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to work over longer distances, those based on JIT in the context of 
subcontracting relations are of much shorter range. When JIT manufacturers 
also use modern manufacturing technology, such as CAD/CAM, then together 
with their general search for flexible production, the positive influence of JIT on 
local outsourcing and, consequently, its effects on regional development will be 
strengthened even further. According to our findings, however, firms are likely to 
outsource at the local level principally goods of low added value. High value-
added, complex goods, by contrast, appear instead to be outsourced in extra-
regional locations. Secondly, firms which engage successfully in technology 
networking are likely to outsource extra-regionally. These two factors, taken 
together, suggest that most proximity localizations may involve low-tech 
activities and, probably, relatively limited job creation. These circumstances 
may reduce the potential of JIT, in the context of subcontracting relationships, to 
the stimulation of new growth poles.   
The findings are important, because both outsourcing and JIT production 
organisation have become two key features of modern economies. In general, 
our results indicate that the spatial organisation of firms is closely related to 
modes of production organisation and probably, comparing our results to those 
of previous studies (Britton, 2003; Holl and Rama, 2009), also to the style of 
company governance. 
This has important theoretical implications. Existing theories are only partial, 
insofar as they explain the spatial dimension of subcontracting. Our empirical 
analysis shows that different types of production organisation are associated 
with different spatial patterns of subcontracting, even among firms with similar 
governance styles. This question has not been sufficiently analysed in existing 
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theoretical approaches. Moreover, the increasing significance of timeliness in 
modern production organisation, as reflected in JIT, requires more in-depth 
review. Analyses of those outsourcing characteristics which increase or restrict 
the impact of JIT on regions are needed. 
The present study focuses on the characteristics of the client company, its type 
of production organisation and the subcontracting relation. Other factors may, 
nevertheless, also influence the spatial dimension of subcontracting. Future 
research may benefit from a more direct analysis of the characteristics of local 
suppliers, the role of local policies in shaping subcontracting patterns and the 
quality of logistics (e.g. technological parks) in the environment. 
From a policy point of view, understanding the spatial extent of subcontracting 
linkages is important, since this indicates the degree to which regions are 
integrated into the national and international economy and to which companies 
are regionally embedded. Such information should be of particular interest to 
policymakers and planners who aim to promote regionally-based industrial 
development. Our results provide some support for the view that modern time-
based production strategies may lead to greater local linkages and the 
agglomeration of related activities. For any regional development effects taking 
place, it will require not only provisions in land use, such as increased local 
availability of industrial sites or technology centres, as well as skilled 
workforces, but also the existence of an industrial base that is already 
sufficiently large to attract new producers and suppliers.  
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Notes: 
1 The literature frequently uses the terms "subcontracting" and "outsourcing" 
interchangeably. The present article uses the term "subcontracting" to refer to 
the outsourcing of manufacturing activities, and not the outsourcing of services, 
which could display a very different spatial pattern. 
2 In Spain, for instance, the literature on the automotive industry has studied 
several regional clusters of suppliers who use JIT for deliveries (Aláez-Aller & 
Erro-Garcés, 2006; Larsson, 2002; Pérez & Sánchez, 2000). 
3 Consistent with the model proposed by Harrigan and Venables (2006), in the 
EOQ optimization approach, greater uncertainty leads to higher buffer stocks; in 
order to reduce these inventory costs, it is also necessary to reduce shipment 
distance (McCann 1993, 1998). We would like to thank an anonymous referee 
for drawing attention to this point. 
4 Torre and Rallet (2005) emphasise that effective interaction among firms 
requires organised proximity, defined as the ability to make members interact 
and based on shared formal and informal rules, common beliefs, a common 
knowledge base, mutual trust and the general integrity of relations. The same 
authors argue that organised proximity is a powerful mechanism for long-
distance coordination, as inter-firm relations among organisations with similar 
characteristics are likely to involve lower transaction costs. 
5 Arm’s-length transactions are those in which the buyer and seller of a product 
act independently of each other and have no mutual relationship apart from 
trade (i.e. there are no ownership or contractual relationships). 
6 Previous studies highlight the importance of outsourcing in these Spanish 
industries (Aláez-Aller and Erro-Garcés, 2006; European-Commission, 1997a, , 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1997b; Larsson, 2002; Rama and Calatrava, 2002; Torreguitart-Mirada and 
Martínez-Parra, 2000) ; Holl and Rama 2009).  
7 Cajamar, Boletín Económico Finaciero, no.25, January 2006. 
8 JIT is a production as well as a purchasing philosophy. Previous studies have 
mainly focused on JIT sourcing. While JIT production and JIT sourcing tend to 
be related, the latter, however, is only an indirect indication of a plant’s 
production system. Moreover, the concept of JIT manufacturing is more 
precisely defined by the use of specific technologies at the plant level. By 
contrast, the concept of JIT sourcing is more likely to depend on less objective 
criteria. 
9 University of Cambridge, Department of Engeneering, 
www.ifm.cam.ac.uk.dstools/process/jit.html, November 2007. 
10 It is difficult to put these figures into perspective, due to the lack of information 
regarding the incidence of JIT manufacturing.  A 1997 survey, however, reports 
that 48.5% of Spanish manufacturing enterprises with more than 50 employees 
used JIT systems (Huerta Arribas et al., 2003) . 
11 Out of the 130 firms in our sample that subcontract production, 2 firms did not 
provide information on the location of their main subcontractors. Some of the 
contractors also perform subcontracted work on behalf of other companies. 
12 Aláez-Aller et al. (1999) find, in a study of automotive supplier firms in the 
Basque Country and Navarre,  that suppliers of parts and single processes tend 
to be local firms.     
13 Some authors (Pennings and Harianto, 1992) find, for instance, that firms 
which have previous  experience of networking are more likely to participate in 
technological alliances.   
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14 The principal results are qualitatively identical, when we restrict our sample to 
electronics and automotive establishments. 
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Table 1. Maximum spatial extent of subcontracting linkages based on the location of 
main suppliers 
 
 Only in the same 
region 
National International 
    
Number of firms 96 24 8 
% 75.0 18.7 6.3 
    
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on survey 
 
 
Table 2. Contingency table: JIT and local subcontracting 
Count 
Row (%) 
Column (%) 
 Local 
subcontracting 
Extra-regional 
subcontracting 
Row 
total 
     
No JIT production  33 
60.0 
34.4 
22 
40.0 
64.7 
55 
100 
42.3 
JIT production  63 
84.0 
65.6 
12 
16.0 
35.3 
75 
100 
57.7 
     
Column total  96 
73.9 
100 
34 
26.1 
100 
130 
100 
100 
Pearson chi-square: 9.463; pr=0.002 
     
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on survey.
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Table 3: Probit estimations of local subcontracting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Plant Characteristics        
Number of 
employees 
 0.0002 
 (0.0004) 
 0.0001 
 (0.0004) 
 0.0000 
 (0.0004) 
 0.0000 
(0.0004) 
-0.0008 
 (0.0008) 
-0.0007 
 (0.0008 
-0.003** 
 (0.001) 
Foreign ownership  0.097 
(0.290) 
 0.090 
(0.300) 
 0.226 
(0.316) 
 0.287 
(0.336) 
 0.490 
(0.463) 
 0.574 
(0.501) 
 0.788 
(0.617) 
Single plant 
establishment 
 0.433 
(0.284) 
 0.258 
(0.291) 
 0.278 
(0.300) 
 0.416 
(0.320) 
 0.263 
(0.398) 
0.414 
(0.426) 
0.694 
(0.500) 
Internal product 
innovation 
-0.304 
(0.339) 
-0.280 
(0.349) 
-0.265 
(0.359) 
-0.436 
(0.388) 
-0.694 
(0.564) 
-0.708 
(0.592 
-0.965 
(0.716) 
External product 
innovation 
-0.693* 
(0.420) 
-0.590 
(0.438) 
-0.724* 
(0.440) 
-0.693 
(0.462) 
-1.436** 
(0.615) 
-1.311** 
(0.634) 
-1.009 
(0.786) 
Production Characteristics        
JIT production 0.842*** 
(0.280) 
0.887*** 
(0.280) 
 0.831***
(0.307) 
1.094*** 
(0.344) 
1.067** 
(0.468) 
1.239* 
(0.501) 
1.757*** 
(0.628) 
Small batch  0.248 
(0.291) 
 0.291 
(0.304) 
 0.326 
(0.322) 
 0.168 
(0.405) 
 0.249 
(0.425) 
-0.175 
(0.495) 
CAD/CAM 
 
  0.647** 
(0.296) 
0.704** 
(0.325) 
1.000** 
(0.417) 
0.936** 
(0.431) 
1.423*** 
(0.530) 
Subcontracting Relation Characteristics        
Stage 1 
subcontracting 
    0.699** 
(0.398) 
1.481*** 
(0.442) 
1.610*** 
(0.472) 
2.064*** 
(0.608) 
Stage 2 
subcontracting 
    0.129 
(0.316) 
 0.426 
(0.428) 
 0.423 
(0.445) 
 0.119 
(0.483) 
Stage 3 
subcontracting 
   -1.378** 
(0.579) 
-2.217*** 
(0.831) 
-2.572*** 
(0.912) 
-3.431*** 
(1.193) 
Stable 
subcontracting 
         -0.934** 
(0.453) 
-0.879* 
 (0.488) 
-1.798*** 
(0.682) 
Supplier assumes 
full responsibility 
        -0.871* 
 (0.516) 
-0.952* 
 (0.595) 
Flexibility as motive                 0.442** 
(0.200) 
Sector dummies        
Electronics sector  -0.165 
(0.301) 
-0.271 
(0.313) 
-0.359 
(0.321) 
-0.319 
(0.344) 
-0.282 
(0.436) 
-0.490 
(0.463) 
-1.159** 
(0.551) 
Other transport 
equipment  
-1.022 
(0.689) 
-1.065 
(0.678) 
-1.267* 
(0.682) 
-1.394** 
 (0.682) 
-1.990*** 
(0.776) 
-1.874** 
(0.791) 
-3.588*** 
(1.102) 
Other sectors  0.356 
(0.626) 
 0.298 
(0.628) 
 0.225 
(0.673) 
 0.888 
(0.897) 
 1.681 
(1.162) 
 1.329 
(1.157) 
 1.826 
(1.670) 
        
No. of observations 125 119 119 119 96 96 91 
Log likelihood -63.768 -60.117 -57.617 -52.674 -36.649 -35.073 -28.010 
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.119 0.156 0.228 0.334 0.363 0.467 
       
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, and * the 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Qualitatively identical results were produced when regional dummies were included in alternative estimations. 
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Table A1. Subcontracting and JIT by sector:  
 
 Full sample Sub-sample of firms that 
subcontract
 
 
 % which  
subcontract 
% using JIT 
production 
% which only 
subcontract 
locally 
% using JIT 
production 
     
Automotive industry 77.4 (82/106) 
64.2 
(68/106) 
78.05 
(64/82) 
63.4 
(52/82) 
Other transport equipment 83.4 (5/6) 
66.7 
(4/6) 
40.0 
(2/5) 
60.0 
(3/5) 
     
Electronics industry 90.0 (36/40) 
47.5 
(19/40) 
66.7 
(24/36) 
50.0 
(18/36) 
Others  70.0 (7/10) 
30.0 
(3/10) 
85.7 
(6/7) 
28.6 
(2/7) 
     
All 80.3 (130/162) 
58.0 
(94/162) 
58.0 
(94/130) 
57.7 
(75/130) 
Note: absolute numbers in parentheses 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on survey 
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Appendix A2.  Variable Description 
 
Name Question Measurement Mean (1) 
Local 
subcontracting 
Where do your principal 
subcontracting suppliers locate?  
1 = Only in the same 
region 
0 = Otherwise 
0.74 
Size No. of employees working in the 
establishment. 
No. of employees 286.8 
Foreign ownership What is the origin of capital? 1 = 100% Spanish  
0 =  Otherwise  
0.50 
Single plant 
establishment 
Is your firm a single plant? 1 = Yes 
0 = Otherwise 
0.45 
Internal product 
innovation 
 
New products have been developed 
internally. 
1 = Yes 
0 = Otherwise (no 
product innovation or in 
collaboration) 
0.53 
External product 
innovation 
 
New products have been developed 
in collaboration with external 
innovators. 
1 = Yes 
0 = Otherwise(no product 
innovation or internal) 
0.13 
JIT manufacturing  Do you use JIT manufacturing 
technology? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
0.57 
Small batch 
production (2) 
Type of production 1 = small batch 
production 
0 = otherwise 
0.46 
CAD/CAM Do you use CAD/CAM production? 1 = yes 
0 = no 
0.51 
Stage of subcontracting: Respondents followed a Likert 1-5 scale, where 1 is “Never” and 5 is 
“Always” 
Stage 1 
subcontracting 
Do you outsource the manufacturing 
of parts and components to be 
integrated in the final product?   
1 = rated as 4 and 5 
0 = rated as lower 
0.65 
Stage 2 
subcontracting 
Do you outsource specific phases of 
production to be integrated in the 
final product? 
1 = rated as 4 and 5 
0 = rated as lower 
0.42 
Stage 3 
subcontracting 
Do you outsource the manufacturing 
of the complete final product? 
1 = rated as 4 and 5 
0 = rated as lower 
0.06 
Stage 4 
subcontracting 
Do you outsource services to be 
integrated in the final product? 
1 = rated as 4 and 5 
0 = rated as lower 
0.21 
Stable 
subcontracting 
relations 
What is the average duration of 
contracts with your subcontracting 
suppliers? 
1 = over 2 years 
0 = two or less years 
0.57 
Responsibility 
 
Does your subcontracting supplier 
assume full responsibility? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
0.74 
Flexibility motive 
 
Do you subcontract primarily to 
achieve greater flexibility? 
Respondents followed a 
Likert 1-5 scale, where 1 
is “Never” and 5 is 
“Always” 
3.23 
Notes: (1)  For dummy variables, the percentages indicates the share of “Yes” answers among 
responding firms; (2) also includes manufacturing of single products by project. 
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